USA v. Huang by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-24-1999 
USA v. Huang 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Huang" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 141. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/141 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 24, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-5393 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DA PING HUANG, 
       Appellant 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
D.C. No.: 94-cr-00570-02 
District Judge: Honorable Mary Little Cooper, 
District Judge 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 26, 1999 
 
Before: GREENBERG, ROTH, and ROSENN, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed May 24, 1999) 
 
       George S. Leone 
       Shawna H. Yen 
       Office of United States Attorney 
       970 Broad Street, Room 700 
       Newark, NJ 07102 
       Counsel for Appellee 
 
       Po W. Yuen 
       Yuen & Yuen 
       70 Bowery, Suite 205 
       New York, NY 10013 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises a question of first impression in this 
circuit, and apparently the nation, relating to the 
enforcement of a cooperative plea agreement in the course 
of the sentencing proceedings under the United States 
Guidelines. In determining whether the Government 
breached its agreement under the plea agreement to move 
for a downward departure in the sentencing proceedings 
before the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey, the defendant raised an issue pertaining to the 
scope of review to be employed by the sentencing court 
when the plea agreement does not contain language 
expressly reserving unto the Government the sole discretion 
to determine whether the defendant is entitled to a motion 
for departure under section 5K.1 of the Guidelines. 
 
The district court concluded that the agreement in this 
case must be interpreted as reserving to the Government 
the sole discretion to determine, on a subjective basis, 
whether defendant's cooperation complied with the 
agreement. The court, therefore, held that the Government's 
refusal to move for a downward departure was reviewable 
only for unconstitutional motive or bad faith. The court 
found neither; it held that the Government did not break 
the plea agreement by declining to move for a departure, 
and that no hearing was necessary to resolve the issue. The 
defendant timely appealed.1 We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A federal grand jury for the District of New Jersey 
indicted the defendant Da Ping Huang for conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute 700 grams 
of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and 846 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231 and this court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. 
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(Count I), as well as with the crime of possession with 
intent to distribute 700 grams of heroin in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. S 2 (Count II). 
 
The defendant pled guilty to Count I pursuant to a plea 
agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the 
defendant agreed to cooperate with the Government, 
including truthfully disclosing all information concerning all 
matters about which the Government inquired. The 
agreement also provided that if (1) the defendant fully 
complied with the terms of the plea agreement and (2) 
provided substantial assistance with respect to one or more 
persons who have committed offenses, the Government 
would move the sentencing court for a downward departure 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1. 
 
Prior to the defendant's sentencing, the Government 
informed him that he failed to honor his obligations under 
the plea agreement, and that it would not be moving for a 
downward departure in his sentence. The court sentenced 
the defendant within the guideline range to a term of 80 
months of imprisonment. The defendant appealed to this 
court on the basis that the Government breached its 
obligation under the plea agreement to move for a 
downward departure from the guidelines. This court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether the defendant could establish a breach of the plea 
agreement. 
 
On remand, the defendant conceded that "the 
Government is relieved of its obligations if Da Ping Huang 
had breached the Plea Agreement." The defendant applied 
for specific performance to have the Government move for 
a downward departure of his sentence. Alternatively, he 
moved for leave to withdraw his guilty plea if specific 
performance were denied. The district court heard 
arguments on the defendant's motions. On July 22, 1998, 
the district court by written opinion and order denied the 
motions. 
 
II. 
 
The Government must adhere to the terms of a plea 
agreement because it is well established that the agreement 
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itself is part of the inducement for the defendant to enter a 
guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 
F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989). The defendant has the 
burden to establish breach of a plea agreement by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Conner, 
930 F.2d 1073, 1076 (4th Cir. 1991). Whether the 
Government violated a plea agreement is a question of law 
subject to de novo review. See United States v. Roman, 121 
F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
A. 
 
The cooperative plea agreement provided that if Da Ping 
Huang "fully complies with this agreement prior to his 
sentencing, provides substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of one or more persons who 
have committed offenses," the United States will move the 
sentencing court under section 5K.1 to depart from the 
applied guideline range.2 On appeal, the central question 
that concerns us is whether the district court erred in its 
interpretation that the plea agreement required the 
defendant to satisfy the Government that he complied with 
its terms and provided substantial assistance to the 
Government in the investigation of one or two persons who 
had committed offenses. The defendant contends that the 
plea agreement does not involve an existing ambiguous 
contractual term which requires construction but"involves 
an attempt by the Government to add a term that is 
completely absent from the agreement." (Emphasis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In pertinent part, the plea agreement provided: 
 
       [I]f Da Ping Huang fully complies with this agreement and, prior to 
       his sentencing, provides substantial assistance in the 
investigation 
       or prosecution of one or more persons who have committed offenses, 
       the United States: (1) will move the sentencing court, pursuant to 
       Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, to depart from the 
       otherwise applicable guideline range; (2) may move the sentencing 
       court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e), to impose a sentence lower 
       than the statutory minimum term of imprisonment offive years; or 
       (3) in the event that the sentencing court declines to depart from 
the 
       applicable guideline range, will recommend that the sentencing 
       court impose the minimum sentence required under the applicable 
       guideline range. 
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included). The defendant therefore concludes that it is the 
court, not the prosecution, that determines the issue of fact 
and law, on an objective basis, and that the burden of proof 
is on the Government to establish that the defendant did 
not comply with his obligations under the agreement. If this 
were a case solely of ordinary contract law, there would be 
considerable merit to the defendant's contention. 
 
Unfortunately for the defendant, a cooperative plea 
agreement in a criminal sentencing proceeding under 
current law is not altogether the same as a civil contract 
dispute, although civil contract law is important and useful 
in its interpretation. United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 
1105 (2nd Cir. 1990). The agreement must also be 
construed in light of the applicable federal statute and 
related Sentencing Guidelines. Judge Cooper, in a carefully 
analyzed opinion, examined the law pertaining to plea 
agreements and focused on the absence in this plea 
agreement of any provision in which the Government 
expressly reserved the sole discretion to determine whether 
the defendant is entitled to a motion for a section 5K.1 
departure. The Government concedes that the agreement 
contained no such provision. However, it argues, as it did 
in the district court, that the plea agreement should be 
interpreted similarly to those agreements which expressly 
reserves to the Government "sole discretion" in the matters 
of 5K.1 motions and the exercise of that discretion by the 
Government on a subjective basis. We are constrained to 
agree. 
 
The district court interpreted the plea agreement, 
particularly its critical portions relating to the 
Government's obligation to move for a downward departure 
and the defendant's obligation to cooperate, under contract 
law standards. It concluded that the agreement is a 
completely integrated agreement. Nonetheless, it must be 
interpreted in the context of the circumstances under 
which it was formulated and general principles of the 
interpretation of contracts. See Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts S 212(1). 
 
Under the plea agreement, the Government agreed that if 
Da Ping Huang fully complies with this agreement, prior to 
sentencing, provides substantial assistance, the United 
 
                                5 
  
States "(1) will move the sentencing court, pursuant to 
section 5K.1 of the sentencing guidelines to depart from the 
otherwise applicable guideline range; (2) may move the 
sentencing court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) to impose 
a sentence lower than the statutory term of imprisonment 
of five years; ... ." 
 
Thus, although the agreement did not specifically reserve 
to the Government the sole discretion to evaluate whether 
the defendant has rendered substantial assistance, it 
"contemplate[d] that any downward departure motion must 
be made `pursuant to' 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) and Guidelines 
5K1.1." United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2nd 
Cir. 1990). The statute and the policy statement of the 
Guidelines 5K1.1 both provide for downward departures 
when a defendant furnishes substantial assistance. Such 
departures may be made upon motion of the Government. 
When Congress amended the sentencing statute to add 
subsection (e) to 18 U.S.C. S 3553, it limited the district 
court's power to impose a sentence below the level 
established as a minimum "to motions by the Government 
and in accordance with the guidelines and policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 
 
Thus, the plea agreement was implicitly subject to the 
statute and the Sentencing Guidelines and both expressly 
lodge the decision to make the motion in the Government's 
discretion, regardless of whether the Government expressly 
reserved such decision in the plea agreement. See Rexach, 
896 F.2d at 913. The negotiations between the parties to 
the agreement are consistent with this conclusion. The 
district court found that it was undisputed that during the 
plea negotiations, the defendant's counsel demanded that if 
the Government decided not to move for a downward 
departure, it would have to justify that decision in court 
under an objective standard. The Government rejected that 
proposal. 
 
Thus, the district court had a very limited role in 
reviewing the Government's refusal to move for a downward 
departure. In United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 
1998), this court held that a cooperative plea agreement 
providing for a motion for downward departure conditioned 
on satisfaction of the obligation does not altogether strip 
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the district court of power to review the Government's 
performance under the contract. We were persuaded by the 
analysis in Rexach that "a district court is empowered to 
examine for `good faith' a prosecutor's refusal to file a 
S 5K1.1 motion pursuant to a plea agreement that gives the 
prosecutor `sole discretion' to determine whether the 
defendant's assistance was substantial." 141 F.3d at 483. 
This requirement is common in contract law and merely 
requires "that the Government's position be based on an 
honest evaluation of the assistance provided and not on 
considerations extraneous to that assistance." Id. at 484. 
 
We, therefore, agree with the district court and hold that 
the Government's decision not to move for a departure is 
reviewable only for bad faith or an unconstitutional motive. 
Huang has not alleged bad faith or an unconstitutional 
motive. 
 
Thus, the district court denied the defendant's request to 
review the Government's refusal to move for downward 
departure. The court held no hearing because it was 
satisfied from the proffer of the defendant at oral argument 
that a hearing would provide no significant assistance even 
if it were applying the objective standard urged by the 
defendant. We see no error in both the court's denial of the 
defendant's request for review of the Government's action 
and for a hearing. 
 
B. 
 
We turn to the defendant's argument that this court 
must reverse the district court's denial of his motion for 
leave to withdraw his guilty plea because the plea 
agreement expressly provides that it "shall be null and 
void" if it is established that he violated any provision thereof.3 
We disagree. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The agreement provided: 
 
       Should Da Ping Huang withdraw from this agreement, or should Da 
       Ping Huang commit any federal, state or local crime between the 
       date of this agreement and his sentencing in this matter, or should 
       it be established that Da Ping Huang intentionally has given 
       materially false, misleading, or incomplete testimony or 
information 
       or otherwise has violated any provision of this agreement, this 
       agreement shall be null and void. 
 
(emphasis added) 
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The defendant presents the remarkable proposition that 
when the Government refuses to move for a downward 
departure in the sentence because the defendant has not 
performed under his plea agreement, he should be 
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. This would reward 
the defendant for his breach of the plea agreement and turn 
the entire sentencing process in the nation into chaos. It 
makes no sense and we reject it. Moreover, we are troubled 
by the defendant's failure to seek a withdrawal of his guilty 
plea at or prior to his sentencing hearing despite notice 
from the Government before the hearing that it would not 
be making a section 5K1.1 downward departure motion. 
Additionally, the defendant did not seek to withdraw his 
guilty plea in his first appeal to this court. Only on 
December 3, 1997, by letter brief to the district court before 
the status conference on remand did the defendant raise 
this remedy for the first time. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's breach of 
the plea agreement does not permit him to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the 
judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
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